This paper proposes a simple endogenous- ‡uctuations growth model to show: 1) long-run growth and short-run ‡uctuations can be intimately linked; in particular, the rate of long-run growth can be negatively a¤ected by volatilities; 2) imperfect competition can cause endogenous ‡uctuations, and it reduces not only the level of output but also its mean growth rate by amplifying the volatility of the economy; and 3) the welfare gain of stabilization policy can be enormous (e.g., as high as 25% of annual consumption when calibrated to the U.S. data) because policies designed to reduce sunspots-driven ‡uctuations can generate permanently higher rates of growth.
Introduction
Business cycles and growth are undoubtedly the two most important issues in macroeconomics.
Yet they have been traditionally treated as separate areas of macroeconomics, as if ‡uctuations and growth are completely unrelated. This dichotomy is illustrated most clearly by the independent development of the neoclassical growth model (Solow 1956 ) and the Keynesian IS-LM model (Hicks, 1937) . Although the modern real business cycle (RBC) theory, developed by Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Long and Plosser (1983) , intends to end this dichotomy by using a common general-equilibrium framework and by hypothesizing a common driving force for both growth and ‡uctuations (i.e., technology), it nonetheless maintains a fundamental assumption that the mean growth rate of output is independent of the random shocks to the economy. 1 Based on this fundamental assumption, although temporary ‡uctuations may have permanent e¤ects on the level of output, they do not a¤ect the mean growth rate of output (i.e., a distinction between a level e¤ect and a growth e¤ect). Thus, long-run growth and short-run ‡uctuations are still viewed as unrelated and determined by fundamentally di¤erent forces. Therefore, by merely postulating a common driving force for growth and business cycles, the RBC theory has not ended the classical dichotomy. If anything, it may have helped reinforce the dichotomy in a particular way. 2 This is further highlighted by the popularity of the Hodrick-Prescott …lter developed in the RBC literature, which is used widely by macroeconomists to decompose aggregate output into two seemingly independent components: a trend (growth) component and a cyclical component (see, Hodrick and Prescott, 1997). The underling assumption behind this decomposition is that growth and ‡uctuations can be studied in isolation.
One of the most far-reaching implications of this classical dichotomy between growth and ‡uctu-ations is that the welfare gains of eliminating ‡uctuations are trivial compared to that of stimulating long-run growth (Lucas, 1987) . This famous calculation made by Lucas has survived numerous robustness analyses and is a major challenge to the old Keynesian belief that stabilization policies are desirable (see Lucas 2003 , and the references therein). In fact, the policy implication of the Lucas calculation is even more robust than its welfare implication because even if we can …nd models in which the welfare cost of ‡uctuations is large, the gain from stabilization policy may still be small (see, e.g., Kiley 2003 , and Barlevy, 2004a) . The fundamental reason for this is that general-equilibrium business-cycle models typically imply volatile consumption as optimal allocation because the fundamental sources of ‡uctuations (e.g., technology) are exogenous and such ‡uctuations are independent of long-run growth.
Yet there is a growing awareness that the dichotomy between volatility and growth is hard to square with the facts. For example, Ramey and Ramey (1995) present convincing evidence that there is a clear link between business cycle volatility and long-run growth. In particular, countries with high output volatility tend to have low output growth. The robustness of this negative relationship between volatility and growth has also been validated by more recent independent empirical studies. 3 There is also a large theoretical literature lending support to the old Keynesian belief that business cycles can be endogenous, driven largely by animal spirits or self-ful…lling expectations (see, e.g., Azariadis 1981 , Cass and Shell 1983 , Woodford 1986 , Boldrin and Motrucchio 1986, and
Benhabib and Farmer 1994, among others). 4 Recent development of this literature suggests that stochastic dynamic general equilibrium models driven by self-ful…lling expectations may provide better explanations of business cycles (including procyclical productivity) than models driven by exogenous technology shocks. 5 If growth is negatively related to volatility and ‡uctuations are largely endogenous, then the fundamental assumption behind the Lucas calculation is incorrect and should be re-evaluated in light of new models that can truly integrate growth and ‡uctuations. This paper proposes such a model and uses it to demonstrate three key points: 1) long-run growth and short-run ‡uctuations can be negatively linked; 2) imperfect competition can cause ‡uctuations in the mean growth rate of output via coordination failures, and consequently, ine¢ ciencies due to imperfect competition exist not only in the level of output (Okun's gap) but also in its long-run growth rate (growth gap); and 3) the welfare cost of business cycles and the associated gain of stabilization policy can be enormous (as high as 25 50% of consumption when the model is calibrated to the U.S. data).
The model is a simple extension of the AK growth model (e.g., Rebelo 1991 4 There is also a literature studying the possibility of endogenous and deterministic growth cycles. See, e.g., Goodwin (1967) and Benhabib and Nishimura (1985) , among others. 5 See, e.g., Farmer and Guo (1994) , Gali (1994) , Wen (1998) , and Jaimovich (2006), among others.
in the goods market, extrinsic uncertainty can be self-ful…lling and, consequently, the economy can su¤er from coordination failures and endogenous ‡uctuations. In an environment where the …rm's rate of capacity utilization is endogenous, ‡uctuations in the marginal cost translate directly into ‡uctuations in the rate of output growth. These stochastic growth paths, driven by …rms' speculations about aggregate demand under imperfect information, yield a strictly lower mean growth rate than the fundamental-equilibrium growth path -a path in the absence of extrinsic uncertainty (i.e., under full information). Under parameter values calibrated to the U.S. data, the model predicts that a more volatile growth path has a lower mean growth rate. Namely, growth and volatility are negatively related, as in the data. Because of this, the welfare cost of business cycles can be hundreds of times larger than that calculated by Lucas under the assumption of the dichotomy. Since expectations-driven ‡uctuations are ine¢ cient, the welfare gain from stabilization policy is equally signi…cant.
Our analysis is closely related to the work of Barlevy (2004a) . Using an AK endogenous growth model featuring adjustment costs in investment, Barlevy is able to show that volatility and growth can be negatively related. Consequently, the welfare gain of eliminating ‡uctuations can be large since it enhances long-run growth. However, the policy implication of Barlevy's model is fundamentally di¤erent from ours. In Barlevy's model, there is little scope for stabilization policies despite the potentially large welfare gains from eliminating ‡uctuations. This is so because ‡uctuations in Barlevy's model are optimal responses to exogenous shocks. Thus, there is no gain from stabilizing the economy. In our model, ‡uctuations are caused by coordination failures and self-ful…lling expectations, and are themselves ine¢ cient regardless of technology shocks. For this reason, our model provides a better framework to meaningfully gauge the welfare cost of business cycles than models in which ‡uctuations are nothing but optimal. 6 2 The Model
Firms
There is a …nal good production sector in the economy. The …nal good producers behave competitively and the households buy the …nal good for both consumption and investment. The …nal good is produced by using intermediate goods according to the Dixit-Stiglitz technology: Substituting this into the production function yields the aggregate price index,
The economy has a continuum of monopolistic intermediate good producers of measure one, each producing a single di¤erentiated good y(i). Intermediate goods are produced by using capital (k). The production function for intermediate goods is identical across …rms and is given by:
where A denotes the level of technology common to all …rms and u(i) denotes the rate of capacity utilization for …rm i. Intermediate good producers are assumed to be price takers in the input market. Let r denote the market interest rate, and let (i) denote the rate of capital depreciation for …rm i. Following Greenwood et al. (1988) , the rate of capital depreciation is assumed to depend on its usage rate:
Hence the user's cost of capital facing …rm i is r + (i). 7 The cost function of an intermediate …rm can be found by minimizing [r + (i)] k(i) subject to
Denoting as the Lagrangian multiplier for the above constraint, cost minimization yields the relationship, r + (i) = Au(i) and u(i) = A:These …rst-order conditions imply
Since the technology has constant returns to scale and …rms face the same interest rate, the marginal cost is the same across all …rms. Consequently, the optimal rates of capital utilization and depreciation are also the same across …rms. Thus, …rms'output di¤er from each other if and only if their capital stocks di¤er.
A key variable determining the endogenous growth rate in an AK model is the interest rate r.
Notice that the equilibrium interest rate in this model is always positive. This is in sharp contrast to the standard AK model where the interest rate (r = A ) can be negative if the returns to capital (A) is less than the rate of capital depreciation ( ). Consequently, an unpleasant feature of the standard AK model is that the long-run growth rate can be either positive or negative, 7 The importance of capacity utilization in understanding business cycles and growth has been emphasized by Greenwood et al. (1988) , King and Rebelo (1999) , Wen (1998) , and Chatterjee (2003) , among others. depending on the relative magnitudes of A and . This unpleasant feature of the standard AK model is eliminated here due to endogenous capital utilization and depreciation, which renders the real interest rate always positive. 8 Each intermediate …rm faces a downward sloping demand curve, y(i) = p(i) Y , and sets prices to maximize pro…ts. Since …rms have no in ‡uence on the aggregate quantity Y , there exists a strategic complementarity among …rms' actions, in the language of Cooper and John (1988) . Namely, every …rm will opt to set lower prices to induce higher demand if they all anticipate that the other …rms will set lower prices to boost the aggregate demand. This strategic complementarity, however, is a necessary but not su¢ cient condition for multiple Nash equilibria in this model. 
subject to the demand function
The optimal price is given by
EY : Assuming that …rms are rational and have the same information sets, then they all set the same prices. Thus, p(i) = p = 1 and
In the limiting case where ! 1, the model converges to a perfectly competitive economy. Our analysis of sunspots equilibria is independent of , hence it applies equally to perfectly (or near- 8 In fact, the rate of optimal capital utilization can be interpreted as maximizing the interest rate, r = uA (u), which gives rise to A = 0 (u) or r =
1+
A
: Consequently, optimal capital utilization also maximizes the growth rate in an AK model. perfectly) competitive economies where …rms set prices equal to marginal cost with zero markup in the steady-state. Figure 1 illustrates the sequence of events in the model economy. De…ne~ t as the information set available to price-setting …rms in period t; which includes the entire history of the economy up to period t except the realizations of sunspots (if any) in period t. Denote t as the information set that includes~ t and any realization of sunspots in period t.
Thus we have t ~ t t 1 . Since we do not consider fundamental shocks in this paper, we havẽ t = t 1 . Extension of the analysis to including fundamental shocks is straightforward. 9 Based on this de…nition of information sets, Equation (6) can also be written as
Households
There is a continuum of in…nitely lived identical households of measure one. The representative agent chooses paths of consumption (fC t g 1 t=0 ) and capital holdings (fK t g 1 t=1 ) to solve
subject to K 0 > 0 given and the budget constraint,
where D t denotes real pro…ts distributed from intermediate good …rms. The …rst-order condition is given by
(1 + r t+1 ); plus the transversality condition, lim T !1
Symmetric Rational Expectations Equilibrium
Since the economy's technology is symmetric with respect to all the intermediate inputs, the attention in this paper is restricted to symmetric equilibria where
Notice that in the absence of extrinsic uncertainty, Equation (6) implies that the marginal cost is constant, = 1 : Given the value of , the value of interest rate is then fully determined, as is the balanced growth rate. However, as will be shown shortly, constant marginal cost is not the only possible equilibrium in this model. There are also multiple Nash-sunspots equilibria that feature stochastic marginal cost and stochastic interest rate.
The equilibrium conditions in this economy can be summarized by the following equations:
where the last equation is derived from Equation (6). 10 These three equations, in conjunction with a transversality condition, fully determine the equilibrium paths of the marginal cost, consumption, and the capital stock. In particular, given any path of the marginal cost ( ) as speci…ed by Equation (11), Equations (9) and (10) fully determine the paths of consumption and the capital stock.
Notice that Equation (11) implies
expectations equilibrium path for the marginal cost. 11 The fundamental equilibrium (in the absence of extrinsic uncertainty or sunspots) corresponds to the case where cov( 1 ; ) = 0 and = 1 .
The fundamental equilibrium is clearly unique. 12 But there also exists multiple sunspots equilibria.
1 0 Note that Kt is a state variable known to …rms in the beginning of period t. 1 1 To avoid complex values, the condition E 0 must be imposed. 1 2 Notice that the uniqueness is regardless of fundamental shocks. For example, suppose the technology A is a stochastic process, then in the fundamental equilibrium, we still have = 1 .
To construct such sunspots equilibria, consider the process t = 1 " t ; where " denotes sunspots shocks. Equation (11) implies
Clearly, any random variable satisfying the distribution,
constitutes an equilibrium. This paper restricts attention to i:i:d: sunspots shocks with mean
De…nition 1 A balanced growth path in the model is de…ned as an equilibrium path along which consumption, the capital stock, and output all grow at the same expected rate. ; and the growth rate of output is given by ln
Proof. Since t is i:i:d:; any function of t is also i:i:d: An educated guess of the equilibrium paths of consumption and the capital stock is given by
where
denotes the optimal rate of savings, which is a constant under the i:i:d:
assumption and is derived from the intertemporal Euler equation
Using Equations (14) and (15), it can be shown that
Hence the balanced growth rates of consumption and capital are both given by g = ln [s(1 + ' t )]. The growth rate of output is given by g y = ln
, which has the same (unconditional) expected value as g.
Proposition 3
In the absence of extrinsic uncertainty, the model has a unique balanced growth path with its growth rate determined by g = ln s(1 + ') = ln
Proof. In the absence of extrinsic uncertainty, Equation (6) implies that the marginal cost is constant, = 1 . Hence r and ' are all constant. Consequently, the fundamental (no-sunspots) growth rate in the economy is uniquely determined by ln (1 + r( 1 )). 
Proof. See the Appendix.
As an example, consider the limiting case where = 1: In this case, the deterministic (gross) growth rate is given by g = (1 + r) = 1 + 1+ 1 A
1+
, and the price equation (11) becomes
Since we restrict our attention to the interval, 0 1, the only distribution that can satisfy the above relationship for the marginal cost is the binary distribution, t = f0; 1g with probability f1 p; pg. Under this distribution, we have r t = ' t , hence s = E
The mean (gross) growth rate is hence given by
which is strictly less than the deterministic (gross) growth rate g for any p 2 (0; 1). In this limiting case, the condition,
, is trivially satis…ed.
Calibration
Let the time period to be a year and the time discounting rate = 0:98: 13 For most economies such as the U.S. economy, the markup is around 10% 20%. This implies that = 0:9 0:8 or = 10 6. Let the real annual interest rate be 6% and the annual rate of depreciation be 10% in the deterministic economy without sunspots. 14 Hence Equation (4) Based on the calibrated parameter values, the deterministic growth rate is given by ln s(1+ ') = ln (1 + r) ' 0:0381; in other words, the fundamental growth rate is about 4% a year. To compute the mean growth rate of a stochastic growth path, we generate a time series for t = 1 " t , where the sunspots shock (") has the log-normal distribution ln " N ( ; 2 ) with
Notice that this distribution satis…es Equation (12) and the condition, 0 < E" t < 1.
Based on these calibrated parameter values, Table 1 shows the statistical relationship between volatility and mean growth rate for the range of that yields empirically plausible mean growth rates. The statistics reported in the table are estimates based on simulated time series with sample size of 10 6 . The table shows that, as the standard deviation of the sunspots shock ( ) increases, the standard deviation of the stochastic growth rate ( g ) also increases, while the mean growth rate of the economy ( g) tends to decrease. Table 2 shows that the same result is also con…rmed for a uniform distribution of sunspots shocks. 15 This prediction of a negative relationship between volatility and growth is consistent with the empirical regularity documented by Ramey and Ramey (1995) in cross-country data. 1 3 This value is based on the empirical analysis of Reis (2005) . 1 4 The average interest rate in the model can be signi…cantly lower under the in ‡uence of sunspots than it is in the deterministic equilibrium. 1 5 Even with the large sample size, the standard deviation of the growth rate ( g ) is quite large for the log-normal distribution, suggesting that the estimated mean growth rate can have large standard errors. Despite this, the tendency for the mean growth rate to decline as the growth volatility increases is clear from Table 1 . When a uniform distribution is assumed instead for sunspots shocks, the standard error of the growth rate ( g ) is much smaller and the mean growth rate is more tightly estimated, which makes the negative relationship between volatility and growth even clearer (see Table 2 ). Note that under the uniform distribution the growth rate of the model is always positive when the parameters of the distribution (mean and variance) of sunspots shocks satisfy Equation (12). data. Since the mean growth rate in the model under a particular sunspots process is lower than that of the U.S. data, the implied consumption level (Window B or D) is stochastically dominated by the U.S. consumption level. Notice that a mean growth rate similar to the actual U.S. data can also be generated from the model by using sunspots shocks with a smaller variance than the one represented by the solid lines. As suggested by Windows B and D, along a lower consumption growth path due to a higher volatility, the loss in consumption is irreversible (unrecoverable) even if the mean growth rate later recovers to the previous level due to a decrease in volatility. The fact that such a large and ever increasing gap in consumption levels, in sharp contrast to the Okun's gap and the random walk phenomenon, can be caused by business cycles (volatility) alone is striking.
The lesson is that, when growth is endogenous, ‡uctuations can a¤ect not only the consumption level permanently, but also its long-run growth rate permanently. 
Welfare Cost of Fluctuations

The Lucas Calculation
The Lucas calculation of the cost of business cycles is based on a simple yet fundamental assumption: volatility and growth are unrelated. Given this dichotomy and the fact that the aggregate consumption series is smooth, Lucas (1987 and concludes that the welfare cost of ‡uctuations is trivial in terms of consumption goods. Suppose that a representative consumer is endowed with the stochastic consumption stream,
where u is a deterministic growth rate and ln(" t ) is a normally distributed random variable with zero mean and variance 2 . Hence Ee (1=2) 2 " t = 1. The preference over consumption is assumed to be
The welfare gain can be computed as the percentage increase in consumption one would get by eliminating all the volatility, namely:
where measures the welfare gain. Since growth and ‡uctuations are unrelated, can be computed easily by comparing the utilities in a single period: is about 3:5% with a standard deviation of 0:0165. Assuming log utility ( = 1), the welfare cost is estimated to be 1 2 (0:0165) 2 0:014%: This is less than 1:5c / for every $100 of annual consumption. 16 
Calculation based on Hall' s (1978) Random Walk
A crucial feature of the Lucas calculation is that random shocks to consumption have no permanent e¤ect on the consumption level. According to the permanent income theory, however, consumption follows a random walk, hence transitory shocks can have permanent e¤ects (Hall, 1978) . Adopting the random walk framework, the consumption path can be described by
where u is a drift term in the random walk speci…cation of log consumption, which determines the average growth rate of consumption. This characterization of consumption is also an implication of the RBC theory where technology shocks follow random walks. Suppose that the initial consumption level is given by c 0 = A: Equation (24) implies that in the absence of uncertainty (i.e., " t = e 2 =2 for all t), consumption grows at the rate u : c t = Ae ut . It also implies that under random shocks consumption evolves according to
The welfare cost of ‡uctuations can then be computed as the solution ( ) to Equation (22) based on the random-walk consumption in (25) . Again assuming log utility ( = 1) and ln " t N (0; 2 ), Equation (22) (27) Notice that the welfare measure under the random walk assumption is a multiplier, 1 , times the welfare measure of Lucas. This is the result obtained by Obstfeld (1994) . 17 This multiplier exists because a one dollar increase in consumption today is translated into a P 1 t=1 t = 1 dollar increase in life-time consumption. This suggests that when shocks to consumption have permanent e¤ects, the welfare cost of business cycles can be potentially much larger. Letting = 0:98 and = 0:0165; we get 0:67%. This is more than 47 times larger than the welfare gain under the Lucas speci…cation of the consumption path. However, it is still small in absolute magnitude: less than one dollar for every $100 of annual consumption. Notice that this calculation is still based on the assumption that volatility and growth are unrelated. Namely, even if shocks have permanent e¤ects on the level of consumption, they have no e¤ects on the average growth rate of consumption.
Consequently, the welfare cost of ‡uctuations is small.
Calculation based on Ramey and Ramey (1995)
According to the empirical studies of Ramey and Ramey, volatility and growth are negatively related. Hence eliminating volatility should increase the growth rate, which implies a large welfare cost of business cycles, consistent with Lucas's (1987) analysis on the welfare e¤ect of long-run growth. But Lucas did not relate business cycle to growth, hence he failed to appreciate the welfare cost of ‡uctuations. To illustrate this, consider a counterfactual experiment where completely removing uncertainty can increase the growth rate by percent from u to u(1 + ). Then Equation (22) becomes
Under the random-walk consumption path (25), Equation (28) = 0:55%, which is about 16% of the current mean consumption growth rate for the U.S. economy (u = 3:5%).
This implies that = 16% and u = 0:55%. Assuming = 0:98, we have 28%. This is an enormous welfare gain: more than a quarter of total annual consumption. 18 
Calculation Based On Our Model
Consumption in our model follows the path c t = c t 1 [s(1 + ' t )], where c 0 = (1 s)(1 + ' 0 )k 0 .
Notice that since the sunspots shocks are i:i:d:, we have E 0 g(
Hence the expected life-time utility is given by
In the absence of uncertainty, the model implies = 1 ; and the fundamental growth rate of consumption is given by ln (1 + r) = 3:81%. The life-time value of the deterministic consumption path is given by
Comparing the two expressions in (30) and (31) gives the welfare gain:
Notice that the welfare gain is the multiplier ( 1 ) times the di¤erence between the maximum sustainable growth rate under full information and the mean of the stochastic growth rate under sunspots shocks. As Proposition 3 shows, the mean growth rate of a stochastic growth path is strictly less than the fundamental growth rate. Hence is always positive. Furthermore, as Table 1 and Table 2 both show, when the volatility of sunspots shocks increases in the model, the mean of the stochastic growth rate, E ln s(1 + '), decreases, which increases the value of . For example, under the assumption of a log-normal distribution (Table 1) , a standard deviation of 0:3 for sunspots shocks (" t ) implies a stochastic consumption growth path with a standard deviation g = 0:02, which is similar to the U.S. consumption data. Under this volatility, the mean consumption growth is 2:83%. Substituting this number into Equation (32) implies = 24%. Under the assumption of a uniform distribution (Table 2) , a standard deviation of 0:29 for sunspots shocks implies a stochastic growth path with a standard deviation g = 0:016, which almost exactly matches the U.S. consumption data. Under this volatility, the mean consumption growth is 2:69%. Substituting this number into Equation (32) 
Welfare Gain from Stabilization Policy
A large welfare cost of ‡uctuations by no means implies an equally large welfare gain from stabilization policy. The reason is that volatile consumption can itself be optimal. For example, Barlevy (2004a) provides a model in which the welfare cost of ‡uctuations can be at least as large as 7 8
percent of annual consumption. But, since volatile consumption is an optimal response to technology changes in his model, there is no gain from reducing or eliminating consumption ‡uctuations.
Thus, despite the large welfare cost of business cycles, the policy implication of Barlevy's model is the same as the Lucas calculation: stabilization policy is counter-productive and hence undesirable.
However, ‡uctuations in the real world can be highly ine¢ cient as they are in our model. In this case, the welfare gain from stabilizing consumption is as large as the welfare cost of ‡uctuations.
Pareto Optimal Allocation
Consider the Pareto optimal allocation …rst. Without loss of generality, assume = 1. The Pareto allocation is determined by solving the following social planner problem,
subject to
and
De…ne ' t Au t t . It can be shown that under optimal capacity utilization we have t =
A (1+ )= 1+
Thus, in the absence of technology change, t and ' t are constant. The optimal allocation is thus given by
where the balanced growth rate (1 + ') is given by (1 + 1+ A (1+ )= ). The result also holds for the case where A is stochastic.
Optimal Policy without Sunspots
Under imperfect competition and in the absence of extrinsic uncertainty (i.e., no sunspots), the Pareto optimal allocation can be achieved by subsidizing monopolistic …rms for production, which 
The optimal price is given by p = 1 ( ), which is lower than the monopolistic price 1 .
In equilibrium, p = 1, hence the optimal rate of subsidy must satisfy = 1 : Since Pareto allocation requires = 1, the optimal subsidy is given by = 1 . Notice that a positive price requires < 1, which is satis…ed since > 1. The equilibrium allocation of consumption and capital is given by
which is Pareto optimal.
Notice that the optimal policy allows monopolist …rms to make positive pro…ts that are the same as the amount they would make without subsidies. To …nance the amount of subsidies, Y , the government can use a non-distortionary lump-sum tax (T ) on household income. A balanced budget implies T t = Y t .
Optimal Policy under Sunspots
When there exists imperfect information, there is an additional source of ine¢ ciency in the economy -the decrease of the average growth rate due to sunspots-driven ‡uctuations. Hence, we can design two separate policies to deal with the two source of ine¢ ciency: one is the subsidizing policy ( ) discussed above, and another is a stabilization policy (!) to deal with volatility speci…cally. Since ‡uctuations arise from …rms' expectation about other …rms' production levels, the stabilization policy can focus on stabilizing …rms'output level via subsidizing capacity utilization. Consider a policy that subsidizes a …rm's marginal cost of production by the amount, ! t ; for each additional unit of output produced or for each unit-increase in capacity utilization. The cost minimization problem of the intermediate good producer becomes to minimize (r
The …rst order conditions are
These equations imply u t = ( t + ! t )
. The output level is given by
The price-setting problem for an intermediate good …rm is the same as before, which is to maximize
The optimal monopoly price is given by
In a symmetric equilibrium, p(i) = 1, y(i) = Y , and k(i) = K. Substituting out output in the above price equation using Equation (44) gives
As before, we can set = 1 . Hence the pricing rule requires
Clearly, the optimal stabilization policy is given by
Under this policy, the paths of consumption and capital are given by
which were shown to be Pareto optimal previously. Equation (46) implies that the marginal cost is given by E t = 1. Although the marginal cost can be stochastic in equilibrium, its volatility has no consequence on the real variables in the economy under the stabilization policy ! t . In order to have a balanced budget for the government, the government can simultaneously impose a lump-sum income tax on households such that:
We can also combine the two policies together into one single policy that eliminates both types of ine¢ ciencies simultaneously. Clearly, it is still required that ! t = 1 t so as to ensure constant growth rate. Setting = ! and replacing by ! in Equation (46) gives E t = 2 1 2 . In this case, the expected pro…t is the same as before but the markup is smaller than the monopolistic markup but greater than zero.
Optimal Policy under Imperfect Information for the Government
Case 1: Without Technology Shocks
The stabilization policy, ! t = 1 t , requires that the government have full information about the marginal cost, or that t is observable to the Government. In reality, the marginal cost is di¢ cult to observe directly. Here we discuss optimal stabilization policies which do not depend on the observability of the marginal cost. The only assumption required in this policy is that the government can observe the aggregate utilization rate of capital.
Without loss of generality, continue to assume = 1 and, in addition, assume = 1 so that the only source of ine¢ ciency is from sunspots-driven ‡uctuations. 20 Denote u = R 1 0 u(i)di as the aggregate (average) capacity utilization rate, and denote ! t = !(u t ) as the optimal subsidy to each …rm's marginal cost of production via capacity utilization. A …rm's total cost of production is given by (r + (i) !(u)Au(i))k(i). In a symmetric equilibrium, the …rst-order condition from cost minimization is given by
where is the marginal cost. Notice that the Pareto optimal allocation is given by a constant capacity utilization rate, u = A 1 . The key of the policy design is to …nd an incentive compatible subsidy policy !(u t ) such that it is in the best interest of all …rms to choose u t = u in equilibrium.
Proposition 5
The subsidy policy,
achieves the Pareto allocation.
Proof. Equation (52) implies
The monopolist price is determined by the equation E t Y t = EY t : Substituting out t and Y in the price equation gives
which is the …rm's pro…t maximization condition or incentive compatibility condition. De…ne the function P (u) u +1 !(u)Au Au. Substituting the subsidy policy into P (u) gives P (u) > 0 for u 6 = u and P (u) = 0 for u = u . Since EP (u) 6 = 0 is not optimal (or incentive compatible), …rms will never choose u t 6 = u under the above subsidy policy. Note that under the optimal capacity utilization u , the marginal cost is given by t = 1. Hence the allocation under !(u) is Pareto optimal.
Clearly the functional form of the optimal policy is not unique. In fact, any policy function !(u) such that it makes P (u) = 0 if u t = u and P (u) 6 = 0 if u 6 = u is optimal. Whatever the optimal policy is, it must provide incentives to induce …rms to choose u and penalize them when 2 0 Namely, we consider stabilization policies that are separate from . A . This policy is derived by setting = 1 in equation (52). This policy is not e¤ective in eliminating sunspots equilibria because under this policy, P (u) = 0 regardless of u. Hence it cannot eliminate sunspots-driven ‡uctuations.
Case 2: With Technology Shocks
The previous analyses have assumed away any fundamental shocks in order to simplify the exposition. Although allowing for fundamental shocks in the model will not change the results, it does complicate the issue of policy design when information is imperfect for the government. For example, since sunspots shocks to the marginal cost behave very much like technology shocks (i.e., sunspots shocks a¤ect the marginal product of capital by a¤ecting capacity utilization), it may not be possible for the government to distinguish where the shocks are coming from if neither sunspots shocks nor technology shocks are directly observable to the government. In this case, policies that completely stabilize the growth rate are no longer optimal if technology shocks dominate.
We show here that it is still possible to …nd stabilization policies that completely eliminate the undesirable e¤ects of sunspots, provided that the government has access to certain types of information. Assume that the public information available to the government include …rms'output (y) and capital stock (k), and the market interest rate r. To prevent the government from deducing the level of technology (A t ) from the production function, we assume that the government cannot observe the rate of capacity utilization (u). De…ne a …rm's output-capital ratio as z(i) = y(i)=k(i) = Au(i) and the aggregate (average) output-capital ratio as z = R z(i)di. Because z = Y =K is observable to the government, it can be used as the basis for designing stabilization policy. However, note that since z = Au, the government cannot di¤erentiate whether movements in z are caused by technology or by capacity utilization driven by sunspots.
It can be shown that under technology shocks the Pareto optimal allocation is given by u t = . This implies that the Pareto optimal output-capital ratio is given by z t = 1+ r t or r t K t =Y t = 1+ . If there is in ‡uence from sunspots, however, it can be shown that z t = 1+ rt t or r t K t =Y t = 1+ t . The key of the policy design is to …nd an incentive compatible subsidy policy such that it is in the best interest of all …rms to choose z t = z t in equilibrium.
Denote ! t = !(r; z) as the optimal subsidy to each …rm's marginal cost of production, which individual …rms take as given. A …rm's total cost of production is then given by (r + (i) !(r; z)Au(i))k(i). In a symmetric equilibrium, the …rst-order conditions can be expressed as 
The optimal monopoly price is still determined by the pricing rule, E Y = EY . Since Y = zK and K is known to …rms in the beginning of each period, substituting out and Y in the pricing rule gives E 1 + r !(r; z)z z = 0:
De…ne the function P (r; z) (1+ ) r !(z)z z. Since EP (r; z) 6 = 0 is not optimal (or incentive compatible) to …rms, the key of the policy design is to set the subsidy rate !(r; z) such that …rms will never choose an output-capital ratio z t 6 = z t under the subsidy policy. Hence, any policy function !(r; z) such that it makes P (r; z) = 0 if z = z and P (r; z) 6 = 0 if z 6 = z can achieve the Pareto allocation. For example, it is easy to check that the following policy can achieve the Pareto allocation:
!(r; z) = 
Under this policy, we have EP (r; z) = 0 if and only if z = z = 1+ r. When z = z , we can show that t = 1; u t = A 
Conclusion
When business cycles and growth are intimately related and ‡uctuations are endogenous (e.g., due to animal spirits), both the cost of business cycles and the gain from stabilization can be enormous.
This is true regardless of fundamental shocks because the impact of such shocks can be ampli…ed by self-ful…lling expectations. For example, the reason oil shocks in the 1970s have had such a large impact on the U.S. economy could well be that they were ampli…ed by the private sector's expectations and the public sector's lack of experience in stabilizing such shocks (see, e.g., Hamilton 1988a and 1988b, and Aguiar-Conraria and Wen 2006). This paper demonstrates the possibility of such links between growth and business cycles. It shows that ordinary market imperfections (such as imperfect competition and imperfect information) can cause coordination failures, hence making expectations self-ful…lling. In an endogenous growth environment, ‡uctuations in the marginal cost can directly translate into ‡uctuations in growth. Given that volatility due to endogenous ‡uctuations can reduce the mean growth rate, the welfare gain from stabilization can be potentially large. Calibrations to the U.S. data show that the welfare gain from further stabilizing the U.S.
economy can be as large as about 25% of annual consumption, which is in sharp contrast to the Lucas (1987) calculation and the policy implications of that calculation. The optimal stabilization policy we found is consistent with those in practice: stabilize output growth (or capacity utilization)
around a potential target.
Appendix: Proof of Proposition 3.
Proof. The key of the proof is to show that E we then have 
Hence, a su¢ cient condition for the inequality (66) to hold is (69).
